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GUCCI V. ALIBABA: A BALANCED APPROACH TO SECONDARY
LIABILITY FOR E-COMMERCE PLATFORMS
Esther A. Zuccaro*
This Recent Development discusses the future of secondary
liability for e-commerce platforms whose users sell counterfeit
goods in the wake of the ongoing Gucci v. Alibaba litigation.
Should the plaintiffs prevail, e-commerce platforms will be held
accountable to cooperate with brand owners by removing
infringing listings in a timely fashion and sanctioning users who
sell counterfeits in an effective manner, resulting in a more brandprotective environment than that under the current Tiffany v. eBay
standard. Such a result will compel e-commerce platforms to share
the burden of policing counterfeiters with trademark owners,
working together to combat trademark infringement. Not only will
this be a more effective means of discouraging appropriation, but
it will also reinforce public policy goals and ultimately benefit
trademark owners, e-commerce platforms, and consumers.
I.
INTRODUCTION
What qualifies an item as “luxury”? The concept of luxury
“can be as subjective and elusive as it is obvious.”1 High price,
non-essential nature, indulgence, provenance, craftsmanship,
exclusivity, and experience can all be indicators of luxury.2 This
allure attracts consumers to pay top dollar for extravagant and
often unnecessary items.3 Indeed, reputation is a critical component
of luxury; one that is not easily created.4
*

J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2016.
Tom Teicholz, Cult of Luxury: Who Makes High-End Goods and How We
Recognize It, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:56 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
tomteicholz/2015/02/05/cult-of-luxury-what-it-is-who-makes-it-and-how-werecognize-it/.
2
Id.
3
Tom Teicholz, Cult of Luxury: Craftsmanship, Scarcity, and the Hermès
Brand, FORBES (Mar. 12, 2015, 5:31 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
1
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Trademarks are powerful tools for luxury brands, as they
denote the “status, quality, and price of the brand’s goods.” 5
Accordingly, trademarks convey a notion of the brand’s reputation,
undoubtedly a product of the goodwill and quality of the brand’s
goods or services.6 To protect such reputation, luxury brands spend
hundreds of millions of dollars to combat counterfeiting.7 At first
glance, counterfeits or knockoffs may resemble luxury goods;
however they are often made of poor quality materials, lacking the
attention to detail and high standard of craftsmanship for which
luxury brands are known.8 Counterfeiting threatens a brand’s very
livelihood in that consumers may confuse knockoff products with
the genuine articles and conclude that the brand’s luxury items are
of inferior quality and not worth the high price.9
The scope of global counterfeiting efforts is vast and often
considered the “single greatest threat to brand owners.”10 In 2014,
the U.S. Border Patrol confiscated knockoff goods at the border
that would have been valued at $1.2 billion dollars, had they been
genuine pieces.11 Throughout the world, it is estimated that $1.8

tomteicholz/2015/03/12/cult-of-luxury-craftmanship-scarcity-and-the-hermesbrand/.
4
Tom Teicholz, Cult of Luxury: Dolce, Gabbana And The Importance Of A
Good Reputation, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2015, 2:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/tomteicholz/2015/03/20/cult-of-luxury-dolce-gabbana-and-the-importanceof-a-good-reputation/.
5
See Kurt M. Saunders & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, The Liability of Online
Markets for Counterfeit Goods: A Comparative Analysis of Secondary
Trademark Infringement in the United States and Europe, 32 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 37, 38 (2011).
6
See id.
7
French Conglomerate LVMH Has Built its Name on Luxury, THE FASHION
LAW (September 1, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/home/frenchconglomerate-lvmh-has-built-its-name-on-luxury.
8
Saunders & Berger-Walliser, supra note 5, at 38.
9
Id.
10
See First Amended Complaint at 42, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp.
Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
11
Counterfeit.com,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
1,
2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21660111-makers-expensive-bagsclothes-and-watches-are-fighting-fakery-courts-battle.
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trillion dollars in knockoffs are sold every year.12 Counterfeited
items include watches, jewelry, handbags, wallets, clothing,
pharmaceuticals, personal care items, footwear, and consumer
electronics.13 With the advance of new technology, counterfeiting
has become an even larger, more complex threat to brands. In
recent years, with the rise of e-commerce platforms and online
stores, the Internet has redefined the shopping experience. What
was once an activity requiring customers to dress in their finery
and travel downtown has now been reduced to a few clicks of a
mouse. The sheer breadth of items available for purchase online
has grown exponentially as well.14 Online auction websites such as
eBay allow anyone to relatively anonymously sell items on such
platforms.15 With the creation of e-commerce platforms and online
boutiques, online shoppers can buy anything from a two dollar
toothbrush to a two thousand dollar handbag. However, such
convenience comes at a price: instances of trademark infringement
and counterfeiting have become more prevalent with the popularity
of e-commerce websites.16 Online shopping permits consumers to
buy and sell counterfeits from the comfort of their living rooms,
eliminating “dark alleys and basements from the buying
equation.”17 E-commerce marketplaces can provide a successful
setting for counterfeiters: low operating costs to sell on websites,
12

Id.
Id.
14
What is Taobao?, WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 28, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/video/what-is-taobao/69BD4B54-0417-4075-A54D-5FC89
5B5B3F3.html; Paul Grey, How Many (More) Products Does Amazon Sell?,
EXPORT X (August 14, 2014), http://export-x.com/2014/08/14/many-productsamazon-sell-2/. For instance, over 800 million products are available on
Alibaba’s Chinese e-commerce platform Taobao at any time. It is estimated that
Amazon sells over 250 million products in America alone. Id.
15
EBAY, What We Do, https://www.ebayinc.com/our-company/who-we-are/
(last visited October 29, 2015) (“Whether you are buying new or used, plain or
luxurious, commonplace or rare, trendy or one-of-a-kind – if it exists in the
world, it probably is for sale on eBay.”).
16
See Saunders & Berger-Walliser, supra note 5, at 38.
17
Maura Kutner, The Fight Against Fakes Online, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Dec.
14, 2010), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/fashion/trends/a622/fight-againstfakes-online-0111/.
13
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less risk of legal action, and the ability to easily open another store,
should one be shut down.18
Accordingly, e-commerce platforms and Internet operators
have been sued by luxury brands over counterfeits sold by users,
both in the United States and in Europe.19 Trademark owners have
asserted that online marketplaces should be held liable for their
users’ illegal activity because they allow the sale of counterfeits
through their websites.20 Courts have determined the outcome of
such cases based on the requisite level of knowledge e-commerce
platforms possess of their users’ illicit acts.21 The current landscape
of contributory liability law in the United States under the Tiffany
standard 22 protects the e-commerce platform, not the trademark
owner, to the detriment of public policy concerns.23 However, an
ongoing lawsuit, Gucci v. Alibaba,24 carries the potential to shift
the standard to one, which, should the plaintiffs prevail, is more

18

Second Amended Complaint at 47, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding
Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
19
See Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d. Cir. 2010); Louis Vuitton
Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); Perfect
10, Inc. v. Visa Intern. Service Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007); L’Oreal SA
v. eBay Int’l AG [2009] EWHC 1094 (Eng.).
20
See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106 (“Tiffany urged that eBay be held
contributorially liable on the basis that despite that knowledge, it continued to
make its services available to infringing sellers.”)
21
See id. at 107. (“[T]he district court concluded that for Tiffany to establish
eBay’s contributory liability, Tiffany would have to show that eBay ‘knew or
had reason to know of specific instances of actual infringement’ beyond those
that it addressed upon learning of them.”)
22
Id.
23
Id. at 109 (internal citations omitted). The court held:
Tiffany and its amici express their concern that if eBay is not held
liable except when specific counterfeit listings are brought to its
attention, eBay will have no incentive to root out such listings from its
website. They argue that this will effectively require Tiffany and
similarly situated retailers to police eBay’s website – and many others
like it ‘24 hours a day, and 365 days a year.’ They urge that this is a
burden that most mark holders cannot afford to bear.
Id.
24
Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y.
2015).
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brand protective. 25 A verdict for the plaintiffs would safeguard
brands against counterfeiters imposing upon the brands’ good will
and esteemed reputation, and restore confidence in consumers that
what they purchase online is legitimate.
This Recent Development will proceed in five parts: Part II
will introduce the Alibaba marketplace’s history of counterfeiting
issues and the Gucci complaint; Part III will provide an overview
of secondary liability for trademark infringement in the United
States under the Tiffany standard; Part IV will apply the Tiffany
standard to the Gucci complaint and argue why the Plaintiff’s
secondary liability argument should prevail; and Part V will
conclude.
II.

INTRODUCING ALIBABA’S HISTORY OF COUNTERFEITING
ISSUES AND THE GUCCI COMPLAINT

A. The Alibaba Group
Founded sixteen years ago, Alibaba is China’s largest ecommerce company, utilized in eighty percent of online Chinese
commerce.26 Alibaba is a network of interconnected products and
services, 27 constituting an all-in-one e-commerce marketplace,

25

Currently, in the interest of pursuing mediation, the Plaintiffs have entered a
Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice against four of the eleven
Alibaba Defendants: Alibaba.com Investment Holding Limited; Alibaba.com
Investment Limited; Alibaba.com, Inc.; and Taobao Holding, Ltd. The Plaintiffs
are not pursuing mediation with respect to the thirty-one merchant defendants.
In the event that mediation fails, this prospectus will still be valid. See
Stipulation and Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Against
Certain Defendants, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
26
Sarah Gray, Why a company you’ve never heard of is about to take over the
world, SALON (Sept. 18, 2014 11:05 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/09/18/
why_a_company_youve_never_heard_of_is_about_to_take_over_the_world/.
For an introduction to the Alibaba Group, see Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd.
Registration Statement (Form F-1) 1-6 (May 6, 2014) [hereinafter Registration
Statement].
27
What is Alibaba?, WALL STREET JOURNAL, http://projects.wsj.com/
alibaba/?mod=e2tw. 	
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bank, and search engine.28 Alibaba offers services on its platforms
conceptualized as a mix of eBay’s user-generated listings29 and
Amazon’s wide product availability,30 with additional features such
as product search functions and online payment systems, similar to
those of Google31 and PayPal.32 The Alibaba company offers three
main e-commerce websites: Taobao, Tmall, and Alibaba.com.33
Taobao is Alibaba’s largest business, on which vendors may list
items free of charge, but pay for services such as advertising so
that their products stand out.34 Similar to Google, Alibaba makes
money by selling advertising and search placement to Taobao
vendors.35 Tmall is a more upscale e-commerce website on which
large brands such as Nike or Proctor and Gamble pay a hefty fee to
list their products.36 Alibaba also obtains commission from the
28

Id.
eBay is an online auction website that provides a platform for users to buy
and sell goods. EBAY, What is Ebay?, http://pages.ebay.co.uk/help/
account/questions/about-ebay.html (last visited November 19, 2015). See also
eBay, supra note 15.
30
Amazon is an e-commerce platform where customers “can find and
discover virtually anything they want to buy online,” offering “low prices, vast
selection, and convenience.” AMAZON, Overview, http://phx.corporate-ir.net/
phoenix.zhtml?c=176060&p=irol-mediaKit (last visited November 19, 2015).
31
Google offers various technologies such as a search engine, email service,
Internet browser, advertising programs, and cloud computing tools. See
GOOGLE, Our products and services, https://www.google.com/intl/en/about/
company/products/ (last visited November 19, 2015).
32
“Paypal is a service that enables you to pay, send money, and accept
payments without revealing your financial details.” PAYPAL, Checkout with
PayPal – Faster. Safer. Easier., https://www.paypal.com/webapps/mpp/paypalpopup (last visited November 19, 2015). See also Gray, supra note 26.
33
Wall Street Journal, supra note 27. “The Alibaba Defendants have created
an online global marketplace on their websites Alibaba.com, AliExpress.com
and Taobao.com (collectively, the ‘Alibaba Marketplaces’) for the sale of
wholesale and retail products originating from China.” Second Amended
Complaint at 3, Gucci Am. V. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 15-cv-03784
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
34
Wall Street Journal, supra note 27.
35
Alibaba is not the Amazon of China, CNN MONEY (HONG KONG) (Sept. 16,
2014),
http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/15/investing/alibaba-amazon-china/
index.html?iid=EL.
36
Wall Street Journal, supra note 27.
29
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retail brands who sell their goods on Tmall. 37 Alibaba.com
connects Chinese companies with exporters throughout the world.38
Alibaba’s latest venture involved offering over $3.5 billion dollars
for ownership of Youku Tudou, the Chinese equivilant of Youtube,
investing in China’s rapidly growing digital media market.39
Alibaba is arguably the world’s largest e-commerce company,
as it hosts millions of merchants and businesses and boasts
hundreds of millions of users throughout its three principal
websites: Taobao, Tmall, and Alibaba.com.40 According to lead
founder and executive chairman Jack Ma, 41 the company also
employs a so-called Internet “ecosystem,” which permits
consumers to shift between Alibaba’s e-commerce platforms and
mobile apps.42 These apps allow users to perform a myriad of
activities beyond the realm of online shopping, from hailing a taxi
to investing in a money market fund.43
Although the average American consumer has likely never
heard of the company,44 Alibaba handles more business than any
other e-commerce company in the world.45 Alibaba is not only
home of the largest online clothing marketplace,46 it is the most
frequented e-commerce destination in the world. 47 In 2013, it
37

CNN Money, supra note 35.
Chris Wright, So What Exactly Is Alibaba?, FORBES (Sept. 16, 2014),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/09/16/so-what-exactly-is-alibaba/.
39
Alibaba offers $3.6 billion to buy China’s ‘Youtube’, CNN MONEY
(LONDON) (Oct. 16, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/16/technology/
alibaba-youku-tudou-video/index.html.
40
Wright, supra note 38.
41
ALIBABA GROUP, Leadership, http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/about/leadership
(last visited November 19, 2015).
42
CNN Money, supra note 35.
43
Id.
44
See Gray, supra note 26.
45
Wall Street Journal, supra note 27.
46
Gregory Babcock, Alibaba Is the Biggest Online Clothing Marketplace in
the World, and Is Full of Fake Yeezys, Givency, and Everything Else, COMPLEX
(Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.complex.com/style/2014/09/a-sample-of-fakeproducts-on-alibaba/.
47
Wall Street Journal, supra note 27; See Paul Mozur and Juro Osawa,
Alibaba 11.11 Shopping Festival Breaks Record, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Nov.
11, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230464410457
38
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boasted $248 billion dollars in total transactions, a figure greater
than eBay and Amazon’s sales combined.48 In 2015, Alibaba.com
alone boasted 350 million active buyers and more than $12 billion
dollars in earnings.49 On the Chinese equivalent of Black Friday in
2013, Alibaba’s sales totaled $5.75 billion dollars, a figure three
times larger than that Americans spent on all United States online
shopping websites during both Thanksgiving and Black Friday.50
Such large sales are attributable in part to the sheer volume of
Chinese Internet users and the popularity of online shopping in
China.51 There are an estimated 500 million Internet users in China,
compared to the United States population of about 330 million
people.52 Moreover, unlike in the United States, many large cities
in China do not offer shopping malls or large retail centers,
resulting in Chinese residents turning to shopping online for their
retail needs.53 Alibaba’s business thrives on the lack of brick and
mortar stores in China, a hallmark of American shopping.54 Jack
Ma explained, “E-Commerce in the U.S. is like a dessert... It’s just
supplementary to your own business. In China, because the
infrastructure of commerce is [so] bad, e-commerce becomes the
main course.”55
9191590951567808. China is considered the world’s fastest growing ecommerce market; it is estimated that China’s e-commerce market will reach
$713 billion by the year 2017.
48
Wall Street Journal, supra note 27.
49
See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 47–48.
50
See Nicholas Carlson, A Single Chinese Company Dwarfed All Of
America’s Black Friday And Thanksgiving Online Sales In One Day, BUSINESS
INSIDER (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/alibaba-dwarfsamericas-black-friday-2013-12#!KcRrH. Singles Day is the Chinese equivalent
of Black Friday, celebrated every year on November 11, in celebration of single
individuals. Alibaba specifically chose 11/11 as Singles Day because the date is
entirely comprised of ones.
51
See Carlson, supra note 50.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Registration Statement, supra note 26, at Table of Contents. As of 2013,
China’s retail space per capita totaled 0.6 square meters, compared with 2.6
square meters in the United States, 1.3 square meters in the United Kingdom,
1.3 square meters in Japan, and 1.5 square meters in Germany.
55
CNN Money, supra note 35.
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However Alibaba is not merely the Chinese equivalent of
American e-commerce platforms such as eBay or Amazon.56 More
precisely, it is a combination of Amazon, eBay, and Google,
offering platforms in “e-commerce, logistics, cloud computing,
digital marketing[,] and mobile Internet services.” 57 Ma even
rejects the notion that it is an e-commerce company,58 insisting that
Alibaba assists others to execute e-commerce, and does not sell
goods.59 Essentially, Ma emphasized that Alibaba works to connect
buyers and sellers, but Alibaba itself is not a seller.60
Alibaba boasted the largest initial public offering (“IPO”) to
date, with a closing value of $25 billion dollars and company value
of $231 billion dollars.61 According to its IPO filing, Alibaba’s
international strategy focuses on connecting Chinese merchants
and manufacturers with worldwide businesses and consumers.62 In
creating Alibaba, Ma, a former English teacher, aimed from the
very start to compete against Silicon Valley instead of other
Chinese companies, and has been compared to the Steve Jobs or
Bill Gates of China. 63 After Alibaba’s IPO, Ma became the
56

See id.
China’s Alibaba files for landmark IPO, CNN MONEY (NEW YORK) (MAY
7, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/06/investing/alibaba-ipo/index.html;
ALIBABA GROUP, Dear Fellow Shareholder, http://ar.alibabagroup.com/2015/
letter2.html (last visited November 19, 2015).
58
Interestingly, in its F-1 SEC Filing, Alibaba introduces its company and
websites by purporting, “Alibaba is synonymous with e-commerce in China.”
Registration Statement, supra note 26, at Table of Contents.
59
CNN Money, supra note 35.
60
Id.
61
Telis Demos & Juro Osawa, Alibaba Debut Makes a Splash, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Updated Sept. 19, 2014, 8:28PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
alibaba-shares-trade-higher-in-ipo-1411142120.
62
Lulu Yilun Chen, Alibaba Taps Chinese Diaspora as Global Amazon
Battle, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-09-11/alibaba-taps-chinese-diaspora-as-global-amazon-battle. Jack Ma
chose the name ‘Alibaba’ because it could be readily pronounced in nearly any
language, indicative of his global aspirations. See Kevin Chan, Alibaba’s IPO
Caps a Success Tale for Jack Ma, INC (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.inc.com/
associated-press/alibaba-founder-success-tale.html.
63
E.g., Kelvin Chan, Alibaba’s IPO Caps a Success Tale for Jack Ma, INC
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.inc.com/associated-press/alibaba-founder-success57
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wealthiest man in China, possessing a net worth of $25 billion
dollars.64
Alibaba, which has been called “the Internet’s Mecca for
Counterfeit Clothing,”65 has a history of counterfeiting and knockoff items for sale. 66 The Office of the United States Trade
Representative (“USTR”) 67 compiles a Notorious Markets List
every year, identifying certain marketplaces, both on and offline,
“that reportedly engage in and facilitate substantial copyright
piracy and trademark counterfeiting.”68 Alibaba’s websites are no
stranger to the notorious market lists. Alibaba.com was listed in
2008, 2009, and 2010, and Taobao was listed in 2008, 2009, 2010,
and 2011, but were subsequently removed.69 In previous years, the
USTR deemed Taobao, an Alibaba-owned website, a “notorious
marketplace” offering “widespread availability of counterfeit and
pirated goods.”70 In 2012, the USTR removed Taobao from the list
due to its attempts to address counterfeiting and trademark
tale.html; Mark Hanrahan, What Is Alibaba? China’s E-Commerce Giant
Explained,
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Sept.
18,
2014),
http://www.ibtimes.com/what-alibaba-chinas-e-commerce-giant-explained-1690
996.
64
Wall Street Journal, supra note 27.
65
Cameron Wolf, Alibaba, The Internet’s Mecca for Counterfeit Clothing, Is
Being Sued by a Group of High-Fashion Brands, COMPLEX (May 18, 2015),
http://www.complex.com/style/2015/05/alibaba-being-sued-by-kering-group-again.
66
Babcock, supra note 46.
67
The Office of the United States Trade Representative is an executive
agency “responsible for developing and coordinating U.S. international trade,
commodity, and direct investment policy, and overseeing negotiations with
other countries.” Mission of the USTR, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE, https://ustr.gov/about-us/about-ustr (last visited October 30,
2015).
68
OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 Out-of-Cycle Review of
Notorious Markets 2 (2015), available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
2014%20Notorious%20Markets%20List%20-%20Published_0.pdf (last visited
October 30, 2015).
69
Registration Statement, supra note 26, at 30–31.
70
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 68, at 8; see also
Sophia Yan, Alibaba has a major counterfeit problem, CNN MONEY (Hong
Kong) (September 12, 2014, 7:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/11/
technology/alibaba-counterfeit-ipo/index.html?iid=EL.
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infringement claims from both brand owners and consumers. 71
Alibaba acknowledged these and other counterfeiting issues,
identifying them as potential risks for investors in its Registration
Statement to the Securities and Exchange Commission:
Although we have adopted measures to verify the authenticity of
products sold on our marketplaces and minimize potential infringement
of third-party intellectual property rights through our intellectual
property infringement complaint and take-down procedures, these
measures may not always be successful. We may be subject to
allegations of civil or criminal liability for unlawful activities carried
out by third parties through our online marketplaces. When we receive
complaints or allegations regarding infringement or counterfeit goods,
we follow certain procedures to verify the nature of the complaint and
the relevant facts. We believe these procedures are important to ensure
confidence in our marketplace among buyers and sellers; however,
these procedures could result in delays in delistings of allegedly
infringing product listings. In the event that alleged counterfeit or
infringing products are listed or sold on our marketplaces or our other
services, we could face claims for such listings, sales, or alleged
infringement or for our failure to act in a timely or effective manner to
restrict or limit such sales or infringement. We may implement further
measures in an effort to protect against these potential liabilities that
could require us to spend substantial additional resources and/or
experience reduced revenues by discontinuing certain service offerings.
In addition, these changes may reduce the attractiveness of our
marketplaces and other services to buyers, sellers, or other users.72

Alibaba’s business model allows the company to profit from
the number of merchants, advertising, and sales occurring on its
platforms.73 To earn profits, Alibaba relies heavily on charging its
merchants for advertising services and transaction fees.74 Due to its
large customer base and multiple marketplaces, the amount of
business transactions on Alibaba trumps those of other ecommerce platforms. 75 In the third quarter of 2015, Alibaba
71

Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 68, at 8.
See Registration Statement, supra note 26, at 30.
73
Yan, supra note 70.
74
See Wall Street Journal, supra note 27.
75
Id. Because of this business model, Alibaba earns less revenue than other
online marketplaces, for instance, falling behind Amazon, Google, and eBay,
respectively, in the third quarter of 2014. For a summary graph, see id.
Nevertheless, Alibaba still enjoys large profits on its revenue, as the millions of
72
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reported a gross merchandise volume 76 of 112 billion dollars,
compared to eBay’s 19.6 billion and Amazon’s 25.4 billion.77
Taobao, Alibaba’s largest online marketplace, is one of the
world’s largest shopping websites, with 7 million vendors listing
800 million products.78 The website offers a variety of items for
sale, from outerwear to folding bicycles. 79 In January 2015,
China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(“SAIC”) estimated that two thirds of products offered on Taobao
were counterfeit.80 Of the 58,000 Dahon folding bikes for sale on
Taobao, Dahon estimates up to half are counterfeit or infringe
upon its intellectual property.81 According to David Hon, chief
merchants who use its shopping platforms heavily rely on purchasing ads to
market and differentiate their products. Id.
76
Gross Merchandise Volume is “the total value of successfully closed
transactions” in a certain quarter. EBAY, Ebay Fast Facts At-A-Glance (Q3
2015), available at https://static.ebayinc.com/static/assets/Uploads/PressRoom/
eBay-Factsheet-Q3-2015.pdf?2 (last visited November 20, 2015).
77
See id.; ALIBABA, Alibaba Group Announces September Quarter 2015
Results
(2015),
available
at
http://www.alibabagroup.com/en/news/
press_pdf/p151027.pdf (last visited November 20, 2015); AMAZON,
Amazon.com Announces Third Quarter Sales Up 23% to $25.4 Billion (2015),
available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9N
Tk4NzcwfENoaWxkSUQ9MzA5MjM4fFR5cGU9MQ==&t=1 (last visited
November 20, 2015).
78
Kathy Chu & Laurie Burkett, Knockoffs Thrive on Alibaba’s Taobao, WALL
STREET JOURNAL (April 28, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
052702304049904579517642158573008.
79
Id.
80
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note 68, at 8; OFFICE OF THE
U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2015 Special 301 Report, 40 (2015), available at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2015-Special-301-Report-FINAL.pdf
(last
visited October 30, 2015); 5 risks for investors buying Alibaba shares, CNN
MONEY (HONG KONG), (Sept. 17, 2014), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/16/
investing/alibaba-ipo-risks/. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, supra note
68, at 8 (“The SAIC report is no longer available on the SAIC website.
According to unofficial translations of the report (see, e.g.,
http://money.163.com/15/0129/13/AH4N7AAK00254TFQ.html), SAIC faulted
Alibaba Group for failing to take effective measures to address a range of
problems, including against trademark infringement, for requiring parties to
waive claims to operator liability, and for imposing unreasonable burdens on
consumers who wish to file complaints.”).
81
Chu & Burkett, supra note 78.
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executive of Dahon, the number of counterfeit Dahon bicycles
have multiplied by ten or twenty times as much, from 2012 to
2014.82 Dahon spends about $200,000 dollars per year and employs
four full-time staff members to combat counterfeiting. 83 Hon
purports that despite Dahon’s persistent complaints to Taobao,
“[t]he [counterfeiters] stop doing this for a while, and then a few
months later, they resurface and open another store.”84
Columbia Sportswear has a similar story. Jack Motley, the
director of intellectual property at Columbia Sportswear, asserts
that the brand asks Alibaba to remove up to 3,000 counterfeit
listings per month.85 However, given that there are about 100,000
listings for purportedly “authentic” Columbia products on Taobao,
the fight against knock-offs is seemingly endless. 86 In 2013,
Columbia Sportswear purchased hundreds of listings claiming to
be genuine Columbia products on Taobao, and determined that
82% of products purchased were counterfeit.87
B. The Gucci Complaint
Due to counterfeiting issues like the ones noted above, in May
2015, Kering SA,88 the owner of a group of luxury fashion brands
filed a complaint against Alibaba in the Southern District of New
York alleging that the e-commerce retailer knowingly facilitated its
users’ sales of counterfeit Gucci, Yves Saint Laurent, Balenciaga,

82

Id.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Yan, supra note 70.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Kering is a “growing Group of high-profile, profitable brands that create
apparel and accessories for the luxury and sport & lifestyle markets,”
representing such brands as Gucci, Botegga Veneta, Saint Laurent, Alexander
McQueen, Balenciaga, Brioni, Christopher Kane, McQ, Stella McCartney,
Tomas Maier, Sergio Rossi, Boucheron, Dodo, Girard-Perregaux,
JEANRICHARD, Pomellato, Qeelin, Ulysse Nardin, Puma, Volcom, Cobra, and
Electric. KERING, Who we are, http://www.kering.com/en/group/about-kering
(last visited October 29, 2015).
83
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and Bottega Veneta goods.89 Specifically, the complaint alleges
that:
[t]he Alibaba defendants facilitate and encourage the sale of an
enormous number of counterfeit products through their self-described
‘ecosystem,’ which provides manufacturers, sellers, and buyers of
counterfeit goods with a marketplace for such goods, and provides
online marketing, credit card processing, financing, and shipping
services that effectuate the sale of the Counterfeit Products.90

In 2014, Kering pursued a “nearly identical” lawsuit against
Alibaba, 91 referred to as the “Initial Action,” 92 and was even
awarded a preliminary injunction against Alibaba;93 however, the
complaint was withdrawn after the parties reached a settlement
agreement in August 2014.94 Kering re-filed the lawsuit against
Alibaba because it failed to comply with the terms of the
settlement, namely, its agreement to assist Kering in reducing
counterfeit sales on Alibaba.95 Through a spokesperson, Alibaba
has publicly denied that the complaint has any merit and
emphasized its “strong track record” of working with brands to

89

See First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 3; see also Luxury Brands
are Suing Alibaba over the Sale of Counterfeit Goods, THE FASHION LAW (May
18, 2015), http://www.thefashionlaw.com/luxury-brands-are-suing-alibaba-overthe-sale-of-counterfeit-goods/ (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba
litigation).
90
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4; see also The Fashion
Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba litigation).
91
The Fashion Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and
Alibaba litigation).
92
See Complaint, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No. 14-cv5119 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3.
93
See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3.
94
See Notice Of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice Against Certain
Defendants at 2, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No.14-cv-5119
(S.D.N.Y. 2014); see Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3. See also
Lulu Yilun Chen, Alibaba Cooperates With Kering After Fakes Suit Withdrawn;
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 11, 2014, 1:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-08-11/alibaba-cooperates-with-kering-after-fakes-suit-withdrawn;
The Fashion Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and
Alibaba litigation).
95
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3.; see also The Fashion
Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba litigation).
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battle counterfeiting.96 In September, the plaintiffs were awarded a
permanent injunction and statutory damages pursuant to the
Lanham Act97 against individual merchant defendants, a small step
towards victory for the luxury brands.98
Conversely, Kering’s first amended complaint alleges that
while Alibaba’s policies appear to address counterfeiting issues,
they were purposely designed to allow counterfeiters to continue
with business as usual on their websites Alibaba.com,
AliExpress.com, and Taobao.com, collectively referred to as the
“Alibaba Marketplaces.” 99 For instance, Alibaba’s “three strike
rule” for users selling counterfeits is only applied “if each instance
of infringement involves the same trademark.”100 Moreover, the
complaint alleges that the Alibaba defendants did not recognize
U.S. trademark registrations for takedown notices 101 brought
96

In a written statement, an Alibaba Spokeswoman spoke on behalf of the
company:
We continue to work in partnership with numerous brands to help them
protect their intellectual property, and we have a strong track record of
doing so . . . Unfortunately, Kering Group has chosen the path of
wasteful litigation instead of the path of constructive cooperation. We
believe this complaint has no basis and we will fight it vigorously.
Russell Flannery, Alibaba Criticizes Gucci Owner Kering for ‘Wasteful
Litigation,’ Cites Own IP Record, FORBES (May 17, 2015, 11:02 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2015/05/17/alibaba-criticizes-gucciowner-kering-for-wasteful-ligitation-cites-own-ip-record/. See also The Fashion
Law, supra note 89 (discussing the history of the Gucci and Alibaba litigation).
97
15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012).
98
Default Judgment at 3, Gucci Am. Inc. v. Alibaba Grp. Holding Ltd., No.
15-cv-03784 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
99
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4.
100
First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 4.
101
A takedown notice occurs, pursuant to Alibaba’s Policy, when a trademark
owner submits to Alibaba that a user is infringing on trademark rights and/or
selling counterfeit products. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at
7, 91; ALIBABA, IPR Protection Policy (Updated February 10, 2014),
http://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2049.htm (last visited October 29, 2015)
(“Intellectual
property
right
holders
shall
use
AliProtect
(http://legal.alibaba.com/index.htm) to file intellectual property infringement
claims for centralized processing. Access to AliProtect is also located under the
“Help” tab on the top right corner of the front webpage at the Site.
AliProtect provides an efficient and transparent channel for intellectual property
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against Taobao.com sellers, “even though that site specifically
targets U.S. consumers . . . .”102 Kering argues that by allowing
counterfeiters to continue to operate despite “hav[ing] been
expressly and specifically informed that merchants are selling
counterfeits, and even when the merchants themselves state openly
that they are selling counterfeits,” Alibaba “permit[s] and
encourage[s]” such counterfeiting activities.103 By providing the ecommerce marketplace for counterfeiters storefronts, essential
business support services, marketing and logistical services, and
key word advertising, Alibaba “actively assisted” to “attract
customers to buy Counterfeit Products . . . .”104
III.
OVERVIEW OF SECONDARY LIABILITY FOR TRADEMARK
INFRINGEMENT IN THE U.S. UNDER THE TIFFANY STANDARD
Trademark law serves two purposes: to protect brands from
unfair competition and to protect consumers from deception.105
From an economic standpoint, trademarks serve as source
identifiers; symbols allowing consumers to identify goods or
services that bring satisfaction or reject those that have failed to do
so.106 Trademarks enable consumers to distinguish between similar
right holders to file intellectual property infringement claims and request
takedown of allegedly infringing listings from the Site. Three types of materials
must be submitted to AliProtect to facilitate processing of intellectual property
infringement claims, namely: 1. Proof of identity of the complaining party and
relevant authorization if the complaining party is not the intellectual property
right holder; 2. Proof of intellectual property ownership; 3. Exact clickable
hyperlinks to the relevant allegedly infringing listings on the Site.”)
102
First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 4.
103
Id. at 7.
104
Id. at 7–9.
105
J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 2:2 (4th ed. 2015).
106
Id. at § 2:3. See also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir.
1968) (“Preservation of the trademark as a means of identifying the trademark
owner’s products . . . . serves an important public purpose. It makes effective
competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a
means through which the consumer can identify products which please him and
reward the producer with continued patronage. Without some means of product
identification, informed consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in
quality, could not exist.”).
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products by different companies. 107 Thus “without trademarks,
[t]here could be no pride of workmanship, no credit for good
quality, no responsibility for bad.”108 Counterfeiters who infringe
upon others’ trademarks reduce the value of brands by assuming
the brand owner’s mark and established reputation as their own,
while simultaneously confusing consumers as to the quality and
origin of such products or services.109 Counterfeiters are considered
“economic parasite[s] who must be enjoinable by the law,”
otherwise their actions threaten to destroy the nature of quality
assurance.110
A. The Lanham Act
In the United States, the Lanham Act111 serves as the federal
statutory source of trademark protection. The Lanham Act
originated in the Commerce Clause112 and aims “to promote fair
and efficient competition.” 113 Generally, for a brand owner to
establish trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, it must
prove that its mark is entitled to protection and the infringer’s use
107

See McCarthy, supra note 105 at § 2:3.
Id. at § 2:4 (4th ed. 2015) (quoting Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social
Function of Trademarks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 175 (1949)).
109
Id. at § 2:5. Judge Learned Hand explained:
His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which
bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows
the owner’s reputation, whose quality no longer lies within his own
control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it,
or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face is the symbol
of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a mask.
Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928).
110
McCarthy, supra note 105, at § 2:5.
111
15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012).
112
United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America New York,
Inc., 128 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The history and text of the Lanham Act show
that ‘use in commerce’ reflects Congress’s intent to legislate the limits of its
authority under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to
profit-seeking uses of trademark.”)
113
2 BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN-SOURCE CASEBOOK 29
(2015)
(ebook),
http://tmcasebook.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/
BeebeTMLaw-2.0-Introduction.pdf (providing background on trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act).
108
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of the mark in commerce is likely to cause confusion for
consumers. 114 The Lanham Act specifically provides for direct
liability, occurring when a trademark owner seeks to hold an
infringer liable.115
B. Secondary Liability
However, liability for trademark infringement is not only
limited to those who directly sell goods or services that infringe
upon the trademark rights of others.116 The doctrine of secondary
liability allows a trademark owner to hold a third party responsible
for a direct infringer’s actions, in certain circumstances. The
Lanham Act does not explicitly provide for secondary liability;117
rather, it is “an entirely judge-made doctrine” relying on the
common law.118 Secondary liability lawsuits can be more efficient
and thus preferable for trademark owners because they permit “the
mark owner to secure, in a single proceeding, relief against a party
whose conduct is simultaneously enabling multiple acts of
114

See id. at 3–4 (providing background on trademark infringement under the
Lanham Act).
115
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012).
116
McCarthy, supra note 105 at § 25:17.
117
The Lanham Act states:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant – (a) use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection
with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or cause mistake, or
to deceive; or (b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a
registered mark and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or
colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers,
receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce upon or
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of goods or services on or in connection with which such
use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive,
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies
hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1) (2012). See also Beebe, supra note 114, at 279.
118
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2010)
(“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine that
derives from the common law of torts.”). See also McCarthy, supra note 105, at
§ 25:17.
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infringement by a number of primary infringers.”119 Two branches
of secondary liability exist: vicarious infringement and
contributory infringement.120
1. Vicarious Infringement
Generally, vicarious liability will occur when a third party is
liable for an infringer’s action based on the relationship between
the two.121 Vicarious liability for trademark infringement occurs
when a third party and the direct infringer “have an apparent or
actual partnership, have authority to bind one another in
transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership of
control over the infringing product.” 122 This theory of liability
exists as a joint tortfeasor model.123
2. Contributory Infringement
Contributory liability is the main source of potential liability
for indirect trademark infringement. 124 Generally, contributory
liability may extend trademark infringement liability to “all those
who knowingly encourage or facilitate illegal and tortious
activity.” 125 Due to the limited case law, 126 the doctrine of
contributory trademark infringement is “ill-defined.”127
119

Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online Trademark
Infringement: The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 463, 463
(2014).
120
Saunders & Berger-Walliser, supra note 5, at 37, 42.
121
McCarthy, supra note 105, at § 25:22.
122
Id. at § 25:17 (quoting Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession
Services, Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992)).
123
Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1150 (citing Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309 (2d. Cir. 1963)). See also Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103
(2d Cir. 2010) (“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created
doctrine that derives from the common law of torts.”).
124
McCarthy, supra note 105 at § 25:17.
125
Id.
126
The Second Circuit in Tiffany prefaced their discussion of contributory
liability by first “[a]cknowledging the paucity of case law to guide us.” Tiffany,
600 F.3d at 103. The Court addressed that the Second Circuit had only
encountered contributory trademark infringement in two other decisions, “and
even then in little detail.” Id. at 105.
127
Id. See also McCarthy, supra note 105 at § 25:17.
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a. The Inwood Test
Contributory liability for trademark infringement arises under
the Inwood test.128 The Supreme Court in Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. 129 determined whether a drug
manufacturer could be held vicariously liable for trademark
infringement in creating a generic pill to mimic the look of a
trademarked competitor drug. 130 Ives Laboratories is a drug
manufacturer and seller who received a patent on the drug
cyclandelate in 1955.131 Until 1972 when the patent expired, Ives
possessed the exclusive rights to manufacture and sell
cyclandelate, which it sold under the registered trademark
Cyclospasmol.132 The drug, a white powder, was sold in blue or
blue-red gelatin capsules with the Ives name imprinted and
designated numbers for various doses.133 After the patent expired,
several generic drug manufacturing companies, including Inwood
Laboratories, copied the appearance of Cyclospasmol pills, selling
the cyclandelate drug in identical colored capsules and doses as the
Cyclospasmol pills.134 Such practices are considered normal in the
pharmaceutical industry. 135 Pharmacists, whether they are
dispensing branded Cyclospasmol pills or generic drugs, remove
the capsules from the manufacturer’s container and dispense them
into the pharmacist’s own labeled bottle to provide to consumers.136
Thus, the consumer receives the final product without seeing any
identifying marks other than what is printed on the capsules
themselves.137
Ives Laboratories initiated a trademark infringement action
against Inwood Laboratories, alleging that the generic

128

Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
Id.
130
Id. at 846.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 846–47.
134
Id. at 847.
135
Id.
136
Id. at 848–49.
137
Id. at 849.
129
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manufacturers’ use of identical capsules and catalogs138 comparing
prices and colors of generic pills effectively induced pharmacists
to substitute a generic pill for Cyclospasmol, and to mislabel the
generic substitute as Cyclospasmol. 139 Ives did not claim that
Inwood itself applied the Cyclospasmol trademark to the drugs it
manufactured and sold, but rather that Inwood “contributed to the
infringing activities” of pharmacists who mislabeled the generic
drugs.140 The District Court denied Ives’ request for a preliminary
injunction, because Ives did not establish that Inwood conspired
with the pharmacists who mislabeled the generic drugs. 141 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District
Court’s ruling, relying on the reasoning of Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow
Crest Beverages, Inc.142 The Second Circuit articulated that Inwood
would be liable if it either “suggested, even by implication” that
the retailers should mislabel the generics or if Inwood continued to
sell the generic to retailers “whom they knew or had reason to
know were engaging in infringing practices.”143
The Supreme Court confirmed that trademark infringement
liability can extend beyond those who actually infringe upon
others’ trademarks.144 In certain situations, a manufacturer can be
liable for the trademark infringement of others within the
distribution chain, even if the manufacturer does not directly
138

Catalogs are a standard marketing tool in the pharmaceutical industry, which
promote drug manufacturers’ products through distribution to hospitals, retail
pharmacies, and wholesale buyers. Id. at 847–48.
139
Id. at 850.
140
Id.
141
See id. at 851.
142
Inwood, 456 U.S. at 851–52; 64 F. Supp. 980 (D. Mass. 1946), aff’d, 162
F.2d 280 (1st Cir. 1947) (“Relying primarily upon Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest
Beverages, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 980 (Mass. 1946), aff’d 162 F.2d 280 (CA1), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 809, 68 S.Ct. 110, 92 L.Ed. 386 (1947), the court stated that
the petitioners would be liable under § 32 either if they suggested, even by
implication, that retailers fill bottles with generic cyclandelate and label the
bottle with Ives’ trademark or if the petitioners continued to sell cyclandelate to
retailers whom they knew or had reason to know were engaging in infringing
practices.”).
143
See id.
144
See id. at 853–54.
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control them.145 The Supreme Court then articulated what is now
known as the Inwood test:
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to
infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.146

Thus, Inwood was only liable to Ives for the pharmacists’
trademark infringement if it intentionally induced the pharmacists
to mislabel the generics, or if it continued to provide the generics
to the pharmacists, knowing that the pharmacists were mislabeling
the generics.147 Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded that Ives
failed to make either showing of fact to the District Court.148
The Inwood test—now thirty-three years old—has been
criticized in recent years for its inadequate application to modern
e-commerce contexts. 149 Inwood can be difficult to apply to
Internet marketplaces because such platforms allow users to
generate listings and often do not possess actual knowledge of
trademark infringement until they are notified of such, if they ever
possess such knowledge.150 As a result, the level of knowledge
required by the Inwood test weighs in favor of e-commerce
platforms, due to “intentionally inducing” or “continuing to
supply” serving as difficult standards for trademark owners to
prove, by the very nature of internet commerce.151
b. Common Fact Patterns in Secondary Liability
In recent years, two common fact patterns have emerged in
secondary liability litigation. 152 Search engines have been the
recipients of lawsuits for selling keyword advertising that resulted

145

Id. at 854.
Id.
147
Id. at 855.
148
Id.
149
Justin N. Redman, Post Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. EBay, Inc.: Establishing A
Clear, Legal Standard For Online Auctions, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 467, 484 (2009).
150
Id.
151
See id.
152
See Dinwoodie, supra note 119, at 466.
146
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in trademark infringement.153 Online auction websites have also
been the subject of claims alleging that the websites should be
responsible for users who engage in illicit counterfeiting and
trademark infringement activities. 154 Secondary liability claims
require courts to balance a trademark owner’s rights with the
advancement of technology.155
c. The Tiffany Standard
In the United States, Tiffany v. eBay has essentially become
“the law of the land,” governing online marketplace liability for
users’ trademark infringement. 156 Tiffany & Co. is known
throughout the world for its luxury goods, which include jewelry,
crystal, and china.157 eBay is an online auction marketplace website
which enables users to purchase and sell goods directly to and
from each other. 158 Prior to 2004, Tiffany became aware that
counterfeit Tiffany merchandise, namely its branded jewelry, was
for sale on eBay’s virtual auction marketplace.159 To investigate the
extent of Tiffany counterfeits on eBay, Tiffany established two
survey “Buying Programs” in 2004 and 2005, in which the brand
purchased various “Tiffany” items on eBay, then inspected the
products to determine how many were counterfeit. 160
153

See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012); 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2013). See also
Dinwoodie, supra note 119, at 466.
154
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010); L’Oreal
SA v. eBay Int’l AG [2009] EWHC 1094 (Eng.). See also Dinwoodie, supra
note 119, at 466.
155
See Dinwoodie, supra note 119, at 464. See also Yafit Lev-Aretz,
Combating Trademark Infringement Online: Secondary Liability v. Partnering
Facility, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 639, 640–41 (2014) (“Indeed, much ink was
spilled over the quest for a balanced approach to secondary liability that would
effectively curb piracy and counterfeiting on the Internet without targeting
innocent websites or otherwise obstructing the free exchange of ideas.”)
156
See Beebe, supra note 113, at 279.
157
Elizabeth K. Levin, A Safe Harbor for Trademark: Reevaluating
Secondary Liability After Tiffany v. Ebay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 500
(2009).
158
Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d. Cir. 2010).
159
See id.
160
Id.
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Approximately 75% of “Tiffany” goods purchased in the 2004 and
2005 Buying Programs were knockoffs.161 Although the district
court found flawed methodology in the Buying Programs, it
determined that from 2004 to 2005, a “significant portion of the
‘Tiffany’ sterling silver jewelry listed on the eBay website . . . was
counterfeit,” and that eBay knew “that some portion of the Tiffany
goods sold on its website might be counterfeit.”162
eBay earns revenue in two ways: by charging fees to the
vendors who list their items on its website, and through charging
transaction fees via its payment processing company, PayPal.163
“Insertion fees” are charged for each listed item, calculated based
on the product’s starting price, ranging from $0.20 to $4.80 per
item.164 When a sale is completed, eBay obtains a “final value fee,”
which is between 5.25% and 10% of the item’s final sale price.165
For an additional cost, eBay also offers vendors additional services
to differentiate their listings, such as the option of including a
border or bold type face.166 eBay-owned PayPal charges vendors a
transaction fee for each processed sale, from 1.9% to 2.9% of the
sale, plus $0.30.167 Because of this business model, eBay’s revenue
increases proportional to the number of products listed for sale and
the price of the products sold.168
The auction website facilitates numerous sales of Tiffany
items, both genuine and counterfeit; from April 2000 to June 2004,
eBay earned $4.1 million dollars in revenue from product listings
with the word “Tiffany” in the title in the Jewelry & Watches
group. 169 Although eBay undoubtedly generates revenue from
every sale on its website, counterfeit or otherwise, the district court
161

Id. In 2004, counterfeits discovered from the buying program totaled
73.1%; in 2005, 75.5%. Id.
162
Id. at 98 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 507
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
163
See Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d. Cir. 2010).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 98.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 97.
168
Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 97 (2d. Cir. 2010).
169
Id. at 98.
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recognized the company’s “interest in eliminating counterfeit
Tiffany merchandise from eBay . . . to preserve the reputation of
its website as a safe place to do business.” 170 After customers
purchase fraudulent Tiffany goods purporting to be authentic, they
may blame eBay.171
eBay’s business model serves to limits its liability, as it merely
provides a venue for the sale of goods and services for the
transactions, but does not itself act as the seller.172 eBay never
physically possesses the items for sale on its website, and generally
does not know whether items sold are in fact ever delivered to
buyers.173 Because it never possessed or inspected the items for sale
in the “Tiffany” listings, eBay was limited in its ability to discern
whether or not such goods were counterfeit.174 Furthermore, eBay
lacked the expertise to discern whether the Tiffany products for
sale were genuine or counterfeit, even if it had an opportunity to
inspect the items.175
In 2010, the Second Circuit examined whether eBay was
responsible for contributory trademark infringement of its vendors
selling counterfeit Tiffany goods. 176 The court determined that
eBay was not contributorially liable for facilitating the sale of
counterfeits, when certain vendors sold counterfeit Tiffany
jewelry.177 Tiffany argued that eBay should be liable under the
second prong of the Inwood test because eBay permitted
counterfeit sellers to use its services and platform “while knowing
or having reason to know that such sellers were infringing
170

Id. (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 486, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
171
Id. eBay in fact received complaints from buyers regarding the purchase of
knockoff Tiffany merchandise. “[D]uring the last six weeks of 2004, 125
consumers complained to eBay about purchasing ‘Tiffany’ items through the
eBay website that they believed to be counterfeit.” Id. (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc.
v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 486, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
172
Id. at 98.
173
Id. at 97.
174
Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98 (2d. Cir. 2010).
175
Id. at 98.
176
See id. at 103.
177
Id.
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Tiffany’s mark.”178 The Court applied the Inwood test to service
providers, 179 concluding that eBay’s generalized knowledge of
counterfeit Tiffany jewelry sales on its website was not an
adequate level of knowledge to impose an affirmative duty upon
eBay to remedy the issue.180
Thus under Tiffany, “a service provider must have more than a
general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used
to sell counterfeit goods.”181 Similarly, a service provider may not
use the defense of “willful blindness,” meaning “[w]hen it has
reason to suspect that users of its service are infringing a protected
mark, it may not shield itself from learning of the particular
infringing transactions by looking the other way.”182 For liability
purposes, a service provider who is willfully blind to counterfeit
sales is as culpable as a service provider who has actual knowledge
of counterfeit sales.183
Ultimately, the Second Circuit went beyond the scope of the
Inwood test to provide reasoning for why eBay was not liable for
contributory infringement for its users selling counterfeit Tiffany
merchandise on its platform.184 The Court discussed practicality in
determining which party should bear the burden of policing
counterfeiters on eBay, insisting that “[t]o impose liability because
eBay cannot guarantee the genuineness of all the purported Tiffany
products offered on its website would unduly inhibit the lawful
resale of genuine Tiffany goods.”185 Primarily, the Second Circuit
emphasized eBay’s anti-counterfeiting measures, another factor
178

Id. at 106.
Id. at 104. The Court noted that Inwood “applies on its face to manufacturers
and distributors of goods,” however the Ninth and Seventh Circuits have applied
the test to service providers in cases such as Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v.
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry
Auction, Inc. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996); and Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
180
Tiffany (NJ), 600 F.3d at 107.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 109.
183
Id. at 110 (quoting Hard Rock Café, 955 F.2d at 1149) (“[W]illful
blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.”) .
184
Id. at 109–10.
185
Id. at 103.
179
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absent from the Inwood test.186 Although eBay generally knew that
some of the purported Tiffany merchandise sold on its website was
counterfeit, the Second Circuit stressed, “[w]ithout more, however,
this knowledge is insufficient to trigger liability under Inwood.”187
Thus, even though eBay was aware that vendors were using its
platform to sell counterfeit Tiffany goods, it was not legally
obligated to act until it had notice that specific items for sale were
counterfeit. 188 Every time Tiffany reported a counterfeit listing,
eBay removed it.189 From 2003-2007, eBay’s policy consisted of
removing such listings within 24 hours of receiving a NOCI; in
fact, eBay deleted seventy to eighty percent of reported listings
within twelve hours of receiving a notification.190 During the same
period of time, eBay removed nearly 285,000 reported counterfeit
Tiffany listings from its website, through its Verified Rights
Owner (‘VeRO’) program.191 eBay’s anti-counterfeiting measures
set the bar high for other e-commerce platforms whose users sell
counterfeit on such websites. Ultimately, the Second Circuit agreed
with the district court’s ruling that “eBay consistently took steps to
improve its technology and develop anti-fraud measures as such

186

Id. at 109–10 (“eBay did not ignore the information it was given about
counterfeit sales on its website.”) Id. at 110.
187
Id.
188
Id. at 107 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463,
508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)) (“The district court concluded that ‘while eBay clearly
possessed general knowledge as to counterfeiting on its website, such
generalized knowledge is insufficient under the Inwood test to impose upon
eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the problem.’”)
189
Tiffany (NJ) v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 103 (2d. Cir. 2010); (“[I]t is
undisputed that eBay promptly removed all listings that Tiffany challenged as
counterfeit and took affirmative steps to identify and remove illegitimate Tiffany
goods.”)
190
See id. at 99.
191
Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“Specifically, Tiffany reported 20,915 listings in 2003; 45,242 listings in 2004;
59,012 listings in 2005; and 134,779 listings in 2006. As of September 30, 2007,
shortly before trial, Tiffany had reported 24,201 listings for 2007. All told,
Tiffany reported 284,149 listings through the VeRO Program.”) (internal
citations omitted).
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measures became technologically feasible and reasonably
available.”192
Undoubtedly, eBay went beyond merely cooperating with
Tiffany’s takedown notices, it took an active role in preventing
counterfeiting on its own website with numerous effective
mechanisms in place, such as hiring Trust and Safety department
staff to combat counterfeiting and implementing a myriad of an
anti-counterfeiting measures such as buyer protection programs, a
fraud engine, and the VeRO program, among others. 193 eBay’s
exemplary anti-counterfeiting procedures serve as a difficult
standard for other e-commerce platforms to follow, which in fact
assists brand owners. Although actual knowledge may be a
difficult standard for trademark owners to prove under the Inwood
test, certainly the abundance of anti-counterfeiting measures
discussed at length in Tiffany will serve as a strict standard to
evaluate other e-commerce platforms’ policies.
IV.

APPLYING TIFFANY TO GUCCI: WHY THE PLAINTIFF’S
SECONDARY LIABILITY ARGUMENT SHOULD PREVAIL
Due to the sheer volume of knockoffs available for sale,
counterfeiters on Alibaba pose a greater threat to trademark owners
than those who sell on other websites such as eBay.194 Whereas
individual eBay vendors may offer a limited number of knockoff
handbags to direct customers, Alibaba vendors are able to also
offer a wholesale approach promising low prices per unit for large
quantity knockoff orders.195 In one instance referenced in the First
Amended Complaint, a counterfeit Gucci handbag was priced
between $2-$5 per unit, for a minimum order of 2,000 units and a
maximum order of up to 50,000 units.196 In contrast, the genuine
Gucci handbag retails for $795.197
192

Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 100 (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F.
Supp. 2d 463, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
193
Id. at 98–01 (discussing eBay’s range of anti-counterfeiting measures).
194
The Economist, supra note 11.
195
See id.
196
See First Amended Complaint, supra note 10, at 55. Other Alibaba vendors
offer to produce 10,000 units per week or up to 500,000 units per month. See id.
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A. Alibaba’s Anti-Counterfeiting Policies
Alibaba maintains that it is also a victim of counterfeiting and
that it tirelessly works against such efforts.198 In an Interview with
Xinhua,199 Ma expressed that counterfeiting hurts Alibaba, as the
sale of one fake product could create the loss of five customers.200
The company employs over 2,000 staff members dedicated to
addressing counterfeiting issues, including reviewing listings
flagged suspicious by brand owners and removing fraudulent
listings.201 However, many brands deny that Alibaba’s efforts are
genuine, as these policies amount to lenient sanctions for vendors
who are found to sell counterfeit goods.202 Alibaba’s current policy
strictly prohibits vendors listing “counterfeits, replicas, or other
unauthorized items” for sale on the website.203 Listings of such
items “shall be subject to removal” by Alibaba. 204 Alibaba
separates prohibited items into two categories: “General
infringements” and “Serious infringements.”205

at 65. One counterfeit vendor on Alibaba purported a maximum order capacity
of an astounding 8,000,000 units per month. See id. at 81.
197
See id. at 54.
198
The Economist, supra note 11.
199
Xinhua is China’s “primary provider of major and authoritative news.”
Brief Introduction to Xinhuanet, XINHUA, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
english2010/special/2011-11/28/c_131274495.htm (last visited October 29,
2015).
200
Ma responded, “I don’t believe success can [be] built on dishonesty,” when
addressing comments suggesting that Alibaba may benefit from counterfeiting.
Counterfeits hurt Alibaba, Chinese ecomony: Jack Ma, XINHUA (October 12,
2015), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-10/12/c_134707013.htm.
201
The Economist, supra note 11.
202
John Ruwitch, Alibaba lobbies to stay off U.S. blacklist list for fakes,
REUTERS (October 18, 2015 12:26 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/
10/18/us-alibaba-counterfeits-idUSKCN0SC04620151018.
203
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Protection Policy, ALIBABA,
http://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2049.htm (last visited September 13, 2015).
204
Id.
205
Enforcement Actions for Intellectual Property Right Infringement Claims
(Updated Apr. 8, 2015), ALIBABA, http://rule.alibaba.com/rule/detail/2043.htm
(last visited September 13, 2015) [hereinafter Alibaba].
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1. Penalties for “General Infringements”
“General infringements” include the unfair use of trademark
rights in product descriptions, hyperlinks, on offer or sale of
products, or confusing or misleading product descriptions. 206
Sanctions for general infringement exists on a points scale, with
remedies ranging from issuing a severe warning to terminating
one’s membership.207 For instance, an image copyright complaint
will assign users six penalty points incurred per infringement, as
will a complaint by an intellectual property owner.208 If a listing is
removed by Alibaba through a “random check,” a user will incur
0.2 penalty point, with a maximum of six points per day.209 If
Alibaba itself removes a listing by a “random check” for either
using a variation of a trademark or listing an infringing product
under an incorrect category, each listing will penalize a user by
two penalty points, with a maximum of twelve points per day.210
The severity of penalties increases with the amount of points users
accrue: six equals a severe warning; twelve points prohibits a user
for posting products for seven days; twenty-four points blocks a
user’s search results for seven days and restricts Request for
Quotations 211 for seven days; thirty-six points blocks a user’s
search results for fourteen days and restricts Request for Quotation
for fourteen days; and forty-eight points ultimately terminates a
user’s membership. 212 Alibaba notes that penalty points are
recorded “for a 365 day period”; they seemingly will return back to
zero after a year.213
206

Id.
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
A Request for Quotation is a detailed compilation of a buyer’s sourcing
requirements which must be submitted to Alibaba before a supplier receives it
and trade may begin. See ALIBABA, About RFQ, http://service.alibaba.com/
ensupplier/faq_detail/13810245.htm?spm=5386.1678117.1699655.7.vZNE2p&i
d=13810245 (last visited October 29, 2015).
212
Alibaba, supra note 205.
213
Id. In one instance, a merchant who received between 24 and 47 points was
still allowed to sell products on Alibaba during the next year. Although the seller
did not start the new year at 0 points, the seller started with half of the points it
207
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2. Penalties for “Serious Infringements”
“Serious infringements” include the offer or sale of products
unauthorized by trademark owners or licensees. 214 Serious
infringement sanctions exist on a three or four-strike system, with
penalties ranging from a warning to account termination. 215
However, it is critical to note that Alibaba users will only move up
the strike system if the same intellectual property owner reports the
same infringing listing more than once.216
The first strike for an infringement complaint results in a
warning, and Alibaba instructs that “[a]ll complaints shall be
counted as the first infringement within the first five days
regardless of the number of complaints. ” 217 The second strike
results in restricting the user from listing products, as well as
blocking search results and the mini-site for seven days.218 The
third strike either results in restricting the user from listing
products and blocking search results and the mini-site for fourteen
days, or account termination. 219 Alibaba specifies that account
termination is appropriate as a third strike “where the member has
been complained by an identical rights holder based on an identical

had in the previous year. See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at
141–42.
214
Alibaba, supra note 205.
215
Id.
216
Id. This policy purportedly “allows merchants to continue to sell
Counterfeit Products as long as they are not caught selling products that infringe
identical trademarks on three different dates.” Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 18, at 145.
217
Alibaba, supra note 205.
218
Id. “For example, if a counterfeiter is caught offering a counterfeit version
of one of Gucci’s products on one day and then is caught offering a counterfeit
version of a different Gucci mark on a second day, the Alibaba Defendants do
not consider that merchant to have earned two ‘strikes,’ and the merchant can
continue to offer Counterfeit Products until they are caught offering products
that infringe on at least four separate occasions.” Second Amended Complaint,
supra note 18, at 145.
219
Alibaba, supra note 205.
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intellectual property,” the same standard for the strike system.220
The fourth strike ultimately results in account termination.221
Alibaba notes that if it receives multiple complaints based on a
single infringing listing within the same day, all of the complaints
together shall count merely as one serious infringement.222 As with
“General Infringements,” Alibaba instructs that “the number of
serious infringements shall be recorded on a rolling basis for a
365-day period;” users seemingly return back to zero after a
year.223
Unsurprisingly, these vague, confusing policies have been
heavily criticized by brand owners as ineffective.224 Recently, the
American Apparel and Footwear Association (“AAFA”) urged the
U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”) to reinstate Alibaba on the
USTR’s blacklist, citing the company’s “unwillingness to make
serious reforms” to their anti-counterfeiting measures, and for
ignoring the AAFA’s concerns.225 In July 2015, the AAFA wrote
an open letter to Jack Ma, calling for changes to Alibaba’s anticounterfeiting policies as a result of failed negotiations over the
years.226 The AAFA’s requests were simple: that Alibaba “begin
addressing counterfeits in a manner that is transparent,
comprehensible, and fast.” 227 Although the AAFA opposed the
220

Id.
Id.
222
Id. “Alibaba considers one report of counterfeit offerings to be one ‘strike’
no matter how many individual Counterfeit Products or types of Counterfeit
Products the merchant is offering.” Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18,
at 145.
223
Alibaba, supra note 205.
224
See Ruwitch, supra note 202.
225
Id.
226
AAFA Calls For Alibaba To Implement New, Transparent AntiCounterfeiting Measures, AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION
(July 17, 2015), https://www.wewear.org/aafa-calls-for-alibaba-to-implementnew-transparent-anti-counterfeiting-measures/.
227
AMERICAN APPAREL & FOOTWEAR ASSOCIATION, LETTER TO JACK MA 2
(July 17, 2015), available at https://www.wewear.org/assets/1/7/AAFA_Letter_
to_Jack_Ma___Attachment_7.17.15.pdf. Attached to the letter was a suggested
strategy to remove counterfeits from Alibaba’s platforms, consisting of four
elements: “easy brand certification,” “brand-controlled take-downs,” “brandapproved sales,” and “transparent verification of progress.” Id. at 3.
221
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USTR’s removal of Taobao from the blacklist in 2012, it has not
recommended re-listing the website until recently. This decision
occurred as a result of four years of unproductive discussions that
did not amount to progress in addressing Alibaba’s issues,
according to AAFA spokeswoman Catherine Michael.228
B. Comparing Alibaba to eBay, through the Tiffany Lens
Kering alleges that Alibaba possesses both actual knowledge of
counterfeiting on its platforms, and employs ineffective policies,
which seemingly discipline users, while in reality permit such
users to maintain their business as usual.229
Under the Tiffany standard, an e-commerce platform is
contributorially liable for trademark infringement if it permits
individuals to use its services, knowing or having reason to know
that such individuals are selling counterfeit items.230 The platform
must have more than a general awareness of counterfeiting on its
website; essentially, it must have specific knowledge of counterfeit
sales, by individual users, and fail to mitigate these transactions.231
1. eBay’s Level of Knowledge
eBay, like Alibaba, provides both a marketplace for sale of
goods and support services for such purchases, but does not sell the
items or physically possess them.232 The district court noted that
eBay possessed “an interest in eliminating counterfeit Tiffany
merchandise from eBay . . . to preserve the reputation of its
website as a safe place to do business.”233 eBay reportedly spent up

228

Other critics of Alibaba’s removal of counterfeit listings include the
Trademark Working Group, whose members include Fortune 500 companies
and other major brands, as well as ANDEMA, a Spanish anti-counterfeiting
group representing seventy companies including the brands Levi’s and Camper.
Ruwitch, supra note 202.
229
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 3–4.
230
See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2010).
231
See id.
232
Id. at 97.
233
Id. at 98 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 469
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
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to twenty million dollars each year to facilitate anti-counterfeiting
measures on its marketplace.234
eBay also partnered with PayPal, its credit card processing
company, to create “buyer protection programs” where purchasers
could obtain refunds for items bought on eBay that turned out to be
counterfeit.235 It created a Trust and Safety department comprised
of four thousand employees to address “trust and safety issues.”236
Two hundred Trust and Safety employees specifically “focus
exclusively on combating infringement,” and seventy “work
exclusively with law enforcement.” 237 In addition, eBay
implemented a “fraud engine” devoted to search for listings that
violate eBay’s counterfeit policies, including filters and keywords
specific to the Tiffany brand.238
To supplement such efforts, eBay also managed a “Verified
Rights Owner (‘VeRO’) Program,” consisting of a “notice-andtakedown system,” where brand owners and trademark owners
could report instances of counterfeiting and intellectual property
violations on eBay listings. 239 Once eBay received a reported
listing, its policy was to remove such listing within twenty-four
hours; in most cases, removing listings within twelve hours of
notification.240 eBay permitted brand owners such as Tiffany to
maintain “About Me” pages on eBay’s website to warn users of
potential counterfeits.241 Tiffany’s page specifically noted in bold
“Most of the purported TIFFANY & CO. silver jewelry and
234

Id. (citing Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 476
(S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id. at 98–99. The fraud engine technology was designed to uncover illegal
and/or counterfeit listings by automatically searching for listings that violate
eBay’s policies. Id. at 99. It included ninety different Tiffany-specific keywords
to designate between counterfeit Tiffany goods and listings for legitimate items.
Id.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id. Such pages also served to educate eBay users of the “products,
intellectual property rights, and legal positions” of brands. Id.
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packaging available on eBay is counterfeit.”242 eBay also created
automatic warning messages which appeared when a user would
list a Tiffany product for sale.243 Although eBay implemented a
“three strikes rule” governing users’ suspension, it would expedite
the suspension process after one violation if it was evident that the
seller offered multiple counterfeit listings and did not otherwise
appear to be a legitimate seller.244
2. Alibaba’s Level of Knowledge
Notably absent from Alibaba’s policies are the straightforward
and effective anti-counterfeiting measures that eBay enacted in
Tiffany, undoubtedly a significant reason underlying the Second
Circuit’s favorable ruling. Unlike eBay, Alibaba did not implement
measures to ensure the authenticity of items sold on its platform,
promptly remove reported counterfeit listings, or suspend third
party sellers from its platform after it was alerted of counterfeit
listings. 245 Because Alibaba “permit[s] and encourage[s]”
individual users to continue selling counterfeit goods on Alibaba’s
various platforms, despite being “expressly and specifically
informed that the merchants are selling counterfeits, and even
when the merchants themselves state openly that they are selling
counterfeits,” under Tiffany, Alibaba should be liable for its users
trademark infringement.246 Not only did Alibaba both know and
should have known that it was encouraging the sale of counterfeits,
242

Id. at 100. Tiffany’s About Me page also heeded the warning, “The only
way you can be certain that you are purchasing a genuine TIFFANY & CO.
product is to purchase it from a Tiffany & Co. retail store, via our website
(www.tiffany.com) or through a Tiffany & Co. catalogue. Tiffany & Co. stores
do not authenticate merchandise. A good jeweler or appraiser may be able to do
this for you.” Id.
243
Id. (“These messages instructed the seller to make sure that the item was
authentic Tiffany merchandise and informed the seller that eBay does not
tolerate the listing of replica, counterfeit, or otherwise unauthorized items and
that violation of this policy could result in suspension of [the seller’s]
account.”). If vendors completed the Tiffany listing, eBay flagged it for review.
Id. (quoting Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 491) (internal citations omitted).
244
Id.
245
See id. at 139–48 (listing a number of ways that Alibaba allegedly
permitted and even facilitated the sale of counterfeit goods on its platforms).
246
See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 7.
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it also allegedly continued such practices to profit from the
transactions.247
First, due to the very nature of the services it provides, Alibaba
“knowingly assisted” counterfeiters “in virtually all aspects of their
illegal operations.”248 Alibaba’s websites provide the marketplace,
“essential support services,” marketing, logistics, 249 keyword
advertising, “cloud-based deep learning,” 250 and payment
processing services 251 that facilitate the sale of counterfeits. 252
Alibaba even provided micro loans to certain small and medium
sized merchants who had issues obtaining credit from large
financial institutions until February 2015.253
Through “proprietary algorithm” technology, Alibaba uses data
analytics to anticipate its buyers’ needs, providing them with
additional merchants and products in an individualized search
247

See id. Alibaba continued to provide its services to counterfeiters even
after the initial lawsuit was filed in 2014, and despite Gucci’s attempts to
remove the sale of counterfeits from Alibaba’s websites. Id.
248
See id. This is due to the Alibaba ecosystem and the numerous support
services it offers to its vendors.
249
Alibaba provides shipping and services to consumers who purchase items
on their platforms. Id. at 135.
250
Alibaba’s marketing and data collection services create targeted marketing
and personalized search results to consumers in order to obtain a greater
conversion rate of sale. See id. at 9, 133–34.
251
Alipay, Alibaba’s payment processing service encourages customers to
purchase items on Alibaba’s marketplaces because it utilizes an escrow service.
When an item is purchased, the sale’s funds are transferred into an escrow
account, to be released only when the consumer confirms receipt or fails to
object within a certain time “it eliminates uncertainty in making purchases over
the Internet.” Id. at 129–30. Furthermore, Alipay owes an obligation to the credit
card networks it processes to conduct due diligence on its sellers and the items
they offer. Id. at 132. The Plaintiffs allege that, in order for Alipay to perform
such due diligence, it would need to determine whether a merchant is selling
illegal items. See id.
252
See id. at 7–10.
253
See id. at 136. To qualify for the loans, merchants must first conduct three
months of activity on Alibaba platforms. Id. Vendors seeking micro loans were
evaluated on the basis of “transactional and behavioral data from sellers,” and if
deemed credit worthy, extended an unsecured loan ranging from 7 to 360 days.
Id.
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engine.254 By responding to users’ searches, the algorithms enabled
consumers to find counterfeit products for sale.255 For instance,
when a consumer searched for “replica” in Alibaba.com’s search
bar, Alibaba’s algorithm included “wristwatches” and then led the
consumer to a counterfeit watch seller.256
Similarly, Alibaba sold keywords to its vendors, such as
“replica,” “knockoff,” “imitation,” “synthetic leather,” and the
Plaintiffs’ trademarks such as “Gucci” or “Balenciaga,” in order
for counterfeiters to market their products.257 When the Plaintiffs’
trademarks were searched on Taobao on or around June 26, 2014,
Gucci generated 119,000 listings; Balenciaga generated 17,000
listings; Bottega Veneta generated 42,300 listings; YSL generated
23,500 listings; and Yves Saint Laurent generated 2,543 listings.258
Misspellings of the Plaintiffs’ trademarks were also suggested;
when a consumer would type “Gucci” into a search bar on an
Alibaba platform, terms such as “cucci” and “guchi” were
recommended.259 According to its business model, Alibaba gains
254

See id. at 8.
See id.
256
See id. at 6. The Plaintiffs allege that the algorithm design was intentional,
as Alibaba “inserted the keyword ‘Gucci’ into the metadata on the HTML code
of web pages generated by such searches alongside the additional keywords
‘synthetic leather.’” Id. at 74.
257
See id. at 8–9, 125–26. (“Importantly, the results that were triggered by the
use of such [advertisement] keywords were typically given the most prominent
placement on a search results page, such as in the top right position, and were
not meaningfully distinguished from the results that are generated through the
Alibaba Defendants’ algorithmic search process . . . .”). Because the ads were
not differentiated from the search results, Alibaba’s practice differentiates and
poses a greater threat to trademark owners than the fact patterns in cases such as
1-800 Contacts, in which the defendants sold advertising keywords containing
trademarks, enabling a competitor’s ad to appear with search results. See 1-800
Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1252-56 (10th Cir. 2013).
258
See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 18, at 126. For complete
figures of merchant listings resulting from trademark searches on Alibaba.com
and Taobao.com, see id. at 126–28.
259
Id. at 9, 122–23. The Plaintiffs allege that the misspellings were
deliberately “designed to allow the merchant to evade detection by brand
owners.” Id. at 123. One merchant, Back to the Guest, described a counterfeit
Gucci handbag using the keywords “Guchi bag,” “Qucci Handbags,” and “Fake
Designer Handbag.” Id. at 124.
255
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revenue from the sale of keywords whenever a consumer clicks on
a keyword advertised store.260 On AliExpress.com alone, a search
conducted for the term “guchi” produced 211 results on or around
June 6, 2014.261 This number escalated to 2,769 results when the
same search was repeated on or around July 20, 2015.262 Both
search results revealed merchants selling counterfeit goods bearing
Gucci trademarks.263
Another reason Alibaba possesses specific knowledge of
counterfeits sold on its website is due to its seller designations of
“Gold Supplier” and “Assessed Supplier” on Alibaba.com. 264
Alibaba obtains revenue for this website primarily from each sale
of “Gold Supplier” designations, a seller membership enabling
members to create premium online stores with additional features
and services. 265 Sellers aim to achieve “Gold Supplier”
designations, as they are more profitable than free unverified
memberships, where a seller’s products will be listed at the
bottom.266 “Assessed Supplier” designations are awarded to “Gold
Suppliers” sellers who have been audited and physically inspected
by a third party company to reassure customers that Alibaba has
reviewed such sellers and confirmed that their goods are authentic
and legal.267 The Plaintiff brands maintain that “Gold Supplier” and
“Assessed Supplier” sellers, despite such designations, sell
counterfeits or sell materials to manufacture counterfeits on
Alibaba.com.268
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The Taobao marketplace poses a larger threat to trademark
infringement. The plaintiffs assert that in the thirty days between
March 22, 2013 and April 22, 2013, over 26,000 counterfeit Gucci
shoes were sold by at least 1400 shops, and over 37,000 counterfeit
Gucci handbags were sold by at least 1300 stores on the Taobao
marketplace alone.269 The complaint alleges that before the Initial
Action was filed, Taobao would remove a reported infringing
listing in ten to fifteen days, if at all.270 Additionally, if a seller’s
infringing listing was removed, the seller would simply resurface
shortly after to continue selling counterfeits.271
Similarly, the Plaintiffs allege that Alibaba’s sanctions for
intellectual property violations, such as the “three strike” policy or
point-based penalty system were not created to prevent trademark
infringement and the sale of counterfeit products.272 “Among other
flaws, the Alibaba Defendants’ purported three strike policy allows
merchants to continue to sell Counterfeit Products so long as they
are not caught selling products that infringe identical trademarks
on three different days.” 273 Moreover, Taobao’s notice and
takedown policy, recently updated in April 2015, permits the
marketplace to prioritize received complaints according to the
rating of the complainant. 274 Such ratings are based on how
accurate complainants have been in the past: if a trademark owner
was at least 90% correct that the listings he reported infringed
intellectual property, a “good” rating will be awarded, resulting in
take-down requests to be addressed within three business days.275
Complainants who less than 90% correct, but at least 45% correct
would earn a “normal” rating with take-down requests addressed
within three business days.276 Should complainants have a history
269
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of being less than 45% correct with their complaints, they will
receive a “bad” rating, with no disclosed timeline to address their
complaints. 277 The Plaintiffs assert that Alibaba allows its
merchants to avoid sanctions from takedown notices by
unreasonably delaying responses to complaints by brand owners,
as well as by inadequately addressing the complaints, or never
addressing the complaints at all.278
C. Policy Considerations
As a result of the Tiffany decision, trademark owners carry the
burden of policing e-commerce marketplaces, and searching for
counterfeits.279 Aside from the duty to address specific instances of
counterfeiting addressed by brand owners, “the Second Circuit
imposed no duty on eBay to investigate the authenticity of the
products sold through its website or to take further steps to combat
the sale of counterfeit products through its forum.”280 This holding
has created burdensome implications for trademark owners, who
have since been obligated to pore over multiple e-commerce sites
on the hunt for counterfeit listings and sellers.281 From a public
policy standpoint, and in the interest of efficiency, e-commerce
websites should be required to assess their own marketplaces for
fraudulent listings and counterfeit sellers. 282 After all, such
websites possess the knowledge and power to do so by
“control[ing] access to their marketplaces,” holding the ability to
“bar counterfeiters, set up filters, review the identity of sellers, and
otherwise impose conditions for entry.”283
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V.
CONCLUSION
Under Tiffany, the standard for contributory liability in the
United States imposes a burden on the trademark owner, largely
shaped by eBay’s vigilant anti-counterfeiting measures on its ecommerce platform. Alibaba’s policies on trademark infringement
are short, vague, and lenient; slaps on the wrist, at best, to no
action whatsoever, at worst. It appears likely that Kering will
prevail under the Tiffany standard for secondary liability against
the Alibaba defendants due to Alibaba’s specific knowledge of
counterfeit products sold on their platform and ineffective
takedown procedures. The preliminary injunction awarded to
Kering in September 2015 provides an early victory for Kering
against individual merchant defendants who directly sold
counterfeits.
From a public policy standpoint, Kering should prevail because
brand owners deserve to be afforded more protection for their
craftsmanship and reputation, both of which can make or break a
brand. Although brand owners currently bear the burden of
policing their trademarks for infringement such as counterfeits on
e-commerce platforms, such marketplaces should have a duty to
implement effective policies regarding users’ trademark
infringement on their website. Moreover, e-commerce platforms
must cooperate with brand owners who report infringing item
listings by removing such listings in a timely fashion and
sanctioning users who sell counterfeits and infringe upon
intellectual property in a manner that is proportional to the
violation. In doing so, e-commerce platforms act to share the
burden of policing counterfeiters with brand owners, resulting in a
partnership to effectively combat trademark infringement. These
efforts would, in turn, benefit not only the trademark owners,
whose good will and reputation will remain intact, but also the ecommerce marketplaces, who can assure customers that their
website is a safe and legitimate place to do business, and the
customers, who ultimately gain reassurance that the item they
purchase on an e-commerce site is what it purports to be.

